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The recent Controversy on "Economics and Happiness" in the November 1997 issue of the 
Economic Journal1 awakened, or at least raised, economists' awareness that "happiness" is an 
interesting and empirically relevant concept for our discipline. Oswald (1997) demonstrates with 
data for the United States and 12 countries of the European Union that (1) money buys happiness, 
but that the effect is small, and sometimes statistically insignificant; (2) unemployment makes 
people very unhappy, over and above the concomitant income loss (as in Clark and Oswald, 
1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). Furthermore, happiness2 is "high among those who 
are married, on high income, women, whites, the well-educated, the self-employed, the retired, 
and those looking after the home. Happiness is apparently U-shaped in age (minimising around 
the 30s)" (Oswald, 1997, p. 1823). 
This paper argues that institutional conditions in the form of the extent and form of democracy 
have systematic and sizeable effects on individual well-being, in addition to demographic and 
economic factors. Using recent interview data from 6,000 residents of Switzerland, we show that 
individuals are cet. par. happier, the better developed the institutions of direct democracy are in 
their area of residence. This also applies to a second institution, the degree of government 
decentralisation (federalism). Finally, we are able to support some of the earlier results for other 
countries and periods with new data also based on a survey with a large sample size. In particular, 
we find that the unemployed are to a great extent less happy than employed persons, and that a 
higher household income level only raises happiness to a small extent. 
1 Determinants of Happiness 
It is useful to differentiate three sets of sources of individual well-being: 
(1) Personality and demographic factors. Several of the above mentioned variables belong to this 
category. They have for many decades been extensively studied by psychologists. Diener, 
Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999) provide a survey, extending and bringing up to date the earlier 
surveys by Wilson (1967) and Diener (1984). Monographs are by Argyle (1987) and Myers 
(1993). 
                                                 
1 Edited by Dixon (1997), with contributions by Oswald (1997), Frank (1997) and Ng (1997). 
2 Happiness is, for simplicity's sake, in the following interchangeably used with the terms satisfaction with life and 
reported subjective well-being. We are aware that subjective well-being is a scientific concept rather than a specific 
measure of well-being, and that it contains affective components i.e. mood and emotions like joy, happiness or 
depression as well as cognitive evaluations of life satisfaction (see e.g. Lucas et al., 1996). However, most of these 
measures are substantially correlated. In the current study we use a measure of satisfaction with life. 
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(2) Micro- and macroeconomic factors.  An early study of the effect of income on happiness is 
due to Easterlin (1974, see also 1995), but psychologists have also undertaken substantial 
work in this direction (see the survey by Diener and Oishi, 1999). In most nations, those 
individuals belonging to the highest income group report somewhat higher subjective well-
being than persons with low income. This relationship is, however, of small size and not 
robust. The often dramatic increase in per capita incomes in recent decades has not raised 
happiness in general; the national indices for subjective well-being have virtually remained 
flat over time. In contrast to findings within a nation, per capita income levels and happiness 
are more strongly positively related across nations (for further discussion see also Kenny, 
1999). 
The influence of the other two major economic variables, unemployment and inflation, is 
clear-cut. Unemployment is correlated with substantial unhappiness. As the income level is 
kept constant, that influence is not due to lower revenue but to non-pecuniary stress. In terms 
of a trade-off, "most regression results imply that an enormous amount of extra income would 
be required to compensate people for having no work" (Oswald, 1997, p. 1821). Individuals 
also have a strong aversion towards inflation and are prepared to carry significant cost to 
evade it: "one percentage point of inflation corresponds to a well-being cost of approximately 
two per cent of the level of income per capita" (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 1997, p. 
18).3 
(3) The third set of influences on happiness relates to the institutional (or constitutional) 
conditions in an economy and society, of which democracy and federalism are of greatest 
importance. To our knowledge, the impact of the extent and design of democratic and federal 
institutions on subjective well-being has, at best, been alluded to, but has never been 
extensively analysed. 
                                                 
3 These results provide welcome and important insights into a broader effort to empirically measure individuals' 
reaction to, and therewith evaluation of, the influence of macro-economic variables. Other approaches are (see more 
extensively Frey, 1991): (i) retreat from society, or at least from the official economy, e.g. by working in the shadow 
sector (e.g. Cowell, 1990; Thomas, 1992); (ii) popularity and election functions (surveys are given e.g. in Nannestad 
and Paldam, 1994; Schneider and Frey, 1988); (iii) political preference functions derived from the behaviour of 
governments and central banks (see the survey and critique in Makin, 1976); (iv) non-conventional political 
participation ranging from demonstrations to publicly motivated strikes (see e.g. Hibbs, 1976; Opp, 1989); and (v) 
use of force, i.e. all sorts of  revolutions and coups d'état (e.g. Hibbs, 1973; Opp, Voss and Gern, 1995). The well-
being functions, together with popularity and election functions, belong to the best defined and statistically most 
advanced efforts to measure the absolute and relative importance of macro-economic conditions for individuals. 
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The determinants of happiness are usually investigated under the assumptions that subjective 
well-being is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable; i.e. two claims economists 
are likely to be sceptical about. To circumvent reservations in regard to a cardinal interpretation 
of subjective variables, it is often possible to treat the subjective data qualitatively in econometric 
analyses. In contrast, whether people associate the same degree of subjective experience with a 
certain score on a ladder for life satisfaction is more difficult to assess. However, there is a lot of 
indirect evidence that cardinalism and interpersonal comparability are practically much less of a 
problem than theoretically. The measures of subjective well-being have high consistency, 
reliability and validity. Happy people are e.g. more often smiling during social interactions 
(Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995), are rated as happy by friends and family members 
(Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz, 1993), as well as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988). 
Furthermore, the measures of subjective well-being have a high degree of stability over time 
(Headey and Wearing, 1989). But there is, of course, room for methodological concerns (e.g. 
Diener et al., 1999: pp. 277-8). Moreover, as will be demonstrated in this paper, the main use of 
happiness measures is not to compare levels, but rather to seek to identify the determinants of 
happiness. 
2 Effects of Institutions on Happiness 
Most political institutions tend to be stable over time, so that a cross-sectional analysis of 
subjective well-being is appropriate. This has been done between countries (e.g. by Veenhoven 
1993; 1999, on the basis of the World Values Survey, and by Diener et al., 1995).4 It is, of 
course, difficult to isolate the effect of particular institutions on reported individual well-being 
because the countries differ in a great variety of aspects. This problem is less acute for 
institutional variations within a (federal) country. As far as we know, this is the first paper using 
cross-regional variations in a happiness study. Cross-regional procedures have been used with 
good results to account for the share of government expenditures between governmental units 
                                                 
4 Considering institutional differences, there is, methodologically, a close relation of this research to cross-country 
growth analysis (see e.g. Barro, 1997). However, this literature has not yet been incorporated into happiness 
research. There is also a relation to well-being measurement in research on economic development. Dasgupta (1993), 
for example, provides a measure of well-being that includes standard of living as well as indices of political and civil 
liberties. 
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with different degrees of direct participation possibilities for its citizens (as done for the United 
States,5 as well as for Switzerland6). 
There are two major reasons why a higher extent of direct political participation possibilities, or 
more strongly developed institutions of direct democracy (in particular via popular referenda and 
initiatives) can be expected to raise citizens' subjective well-being (Cronin, 1989; Budge, 1996, 
or for an economic analysis Frey, 1994). 
Firstly, due to the more active role of the citizens, (professional) politicians are better monitored 
and controlled. Government activity, i.e. public outlays as well as the many other decisions by the 
government, are closer to the wishes of the citizenry.7 As a consequence, satisfaction with 
government output is reflected in a higher level of overall well-being. 
Secondly, the institutions of direct democracy extend the citizens’ possibilities to get involved in 
the political process. Experimental evidence (e.g. Tyler, 1990; Bohnet and Frey, 1999) suggests 
that this procedural effect is independent of the outcome of the political activity itself. 
Federal decentralisation, and, in particular, local autonomy, is another constitutional element 
which can be hypothesised to positively affect citizens' happiness. Political decision making in 
municipalities is closer to relevant information about residents’ preferences and also closer to 
direct control by its citizens (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999). 
3 Data for Econometric Analysis 
Our empirical work is based on the survey results of more than 6,000 residents of Switzerland for 
the year 1992, collected by Leu, Burri and Priester (1997).8 The dependent variable called 
"happiness" is based on the answers to the following question: "How satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days?". Simultaneously, the respondents were shown a table with a 10 point 
scale of which only the two extreme values ("completely dissatisfied" and "completely satisfied") 
were verbalised. The survey found a high general life satisfaction in Switzerland with an average 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Matsusaka (1995) or Rueben (forthcoming) for general government expenditure, or Santerre (1989, 1993) 
for public education expenditures. 
6 See e.g. Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) and Feld and Kirchgässner (1996) for general government 
expenditures. The latter also study the effect on self-financing ratios, taxes, and debt. Pommerehne and Weck (1996) 
and Frey (1997) analyse the effect on tax evasion, and Feld and Savioz (1997) on per capita gross domestic product. 
7 This statement is supported by considerable empirical (econometric) evidence, e.g. Pommerehne (1978, 1990) or 
Gerber (1999). 
8 The survey data were collected to investigate the problem of poverty in Switzerland. Information is from personal 
interviews and tax statistics. 
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of  8.2 out of 10 points. No fewer than 29% of the  interviewees reported a satisfaction level of 10 
("completely satisfied"), 17% of 9, and 27% of 8. The lower end of the happiness-scale, 
"completely dissatisfied" (score 1), score 2 and score 3, were indicated only by 0.4%, 0.5%, and 
0.9%, respectively. As these categories of great unhappiness are thinly populated, they are 
aggregated, leaving us with eight happiness categories.9 
In this paper, as a major explanatory variable, we focus on the institutionalised rights of 
individual political participation, which vary between the 26 Swiss cantons. Due to the federal 
structure of Switzerland, major competences are kept by the cantons (states). As on the national 
level, there exist direct democratic instruments besides representative democratic parliaments and 
governments. The most important direct democratic instruments in cantons are the popular 
initiative to change the canton's constitution or laws, a compulsory and optional referendum to 
prevent new laws, or the changing of existing laws, and optional financial referenda to prevent 
new state expenditure. Citizens’ access to these instruments differ from canton to canton. Thus, 
for example, the number of signatures required to launch an initiative or an optional referendum, 
or the time span within which the signatures have to be collected, varies. The referendum on 
public expenditures may be launched at different levels of additional outlays. For the 26 cantons, 
we constructed an index designed to reflect the extent of direct democratic participation 
possibilities (for details of the index construction, see the Appendix). This index is defined using 
a six point scale with 1 indicating the lowest, and 6 the highest degree of participation 
possibilities for the citizens. Figure 1 provides an overview. 
The purpose of our estimate is to show that the extent of direct democratic participation 
possibilities exerts a statistically significant, robust and sizeable effect on happiness over and 
above the demographic and economic determinants so far taken into account in the literature.  
We also intend to demonstrate that institutional factors are relevant for happiness in general by 
analysing the impact of federalism. The division of the competences between communities and 
the cantonal government reflects the federal structure of a canton or, from the municipalities’ 
point of view, their autonomy. The extent of local autonomy is measured by an index (Ladner 
1994). The index over the 26 cantons is based on survey results. Chief local administrators in 
1856 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local autonomy on a 10 
point scale, with one indicating “no autonomy at all“, and  10 “very high“ communal autonomy. 
                                                 
9 The regrouping of the lowest categories does not change the qualitative results. 
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Fig. 1. Direct democracy in Swiss cantons 
The figure shows the degree of direct democratic participation possibilities in the 26 Swiss cantons, namely Aargau 
(AG), Appenzell i. Rh. (AI), Appenzell a. Rh. (AR), Bern (BE), Basel Land (BL), Basel Stadt (BS), Fribourg (FR), 
Genève (GE), Glarus (GL), Graubünden (GR), Jura (JU), Luzern (LU), Neuchâtel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), 
Obwalden (OW), St. Gallen (SG), Schaffhausen (SH), Solothurn (SO), Schwyz (SZ), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri 
(UR), Vaud (VD), Valais (VS), Zug (ZG) and Zürich (ZH). 
 
The estimation equations regress the indices of individual happiness on three sets of 
determinants: 
1) Demographic variables 
They describe the personal attributes of the respondents and comprise 
- age. Six age groups are explicitly accounted for, ranging from 30 years to 80 years and older 
(the constant term includes the reference group "people younger than 30"); 
- gender (male/female); 
- citizenship (national/foreigner); 
- extent of formal education (middle/high education) (reference group are "people with low 
education"); 
- family setting (single woman or man; couple with children; single parent, other, collective 
household) (reference group are "couple") and 
- individual employment status (self-employed or employee in one’s own firm; housewife or 
houseman; other) (reference group are “employed”). 
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2) Economic variables 
Two influences are considered: 
- Unemployment (the constant term includes the reference group “employed”); 
- Income situation of the household (equivalence income). Total household income after taxes, 
social security expenditure, interests on debts and maintenance is divided through the 
equivalence scale of the Swiss conference for public assistance. Four income groups are 
explicitly distinguished, ranging from Sfr. 2,000 to Sfr. 5,000 per month and more (reference 
group are "people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000"). 
The above two sets of variables10 are used as controls. While they are of obvious interest in 
themselves, they mainly serve to isolate the unbiased influence of the third set of variables. 
3) Political institutions 
The variables included in the estimation models are 
- an index for direct democratic rights and 
- an index for the extent of local (communal) autonomy. 
The latter variables refer to the 26 cantons in Switzerland. The structure of Swiss cantons, 
however, does not only differ in respect of direct democracy and federal organisation but also, 
e.g., in respect of urbanisation. Therefore, to control for further regional differences, we include 
five variables for the size of community and seven variables for the type of community in the 
estimation equations. 
4 Results and Discussion of Econometric Analysis 
We present the results of our econometric analysis in seven separate sections. In sections 4.1 to 
4.4, we discuss the effects of the three sets of demographic, economic and institutional variables 
on happiness. In section 4.5 we perform several tests of robustness which support our 
argumentation. Finally, sections 4.6 and 4.7 indicate who benefits from direct democracy and that 
the benefits can be attributed to a favourable outcome as well as to a favourable direct democratic 
process itself. 
                                                 
10 We cannot address the issue of how inflation affects reported subjective well-being, as our data set is a cross-
section of individuals. 
  9
4.1 Microeconometric Happiness Functions 
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of two microeconometric 
happiness functions, taking into account demographic and economic determinants as well as the 
institutional variable direct democratic rights. In the first equation, a weighted least squares 
model is estimated. In the second one, a weighted ordered probit model is used in order to exploit 
the ranking information contained in the originally scaled dependent variable. The weighting 
variable that is applied allows representative results on the subject level for Switzerland.11 
Throughout the paper, we use a robust estimator of variance because random disturbances are 
potentially correlated within groups or clusters. Here, dependence refers to residents of the same 
canton.12 
The estimation results show statistically significant effects of several demographic factors, all the 
economic variables and, most importantly, the institutional determinant on individual happiness. 
The least squares estimation that treats happiness as a cardinal variable offers qualitatively very 
similar results to the ordered probit model, i.e the results are robust in regard to the estimation 
method. The coefficients of the former model can be interpreted in a simple way: people 
belonging to a certain category on average report happiness scores deviating from that of the 
reference group on the scale of the coefficient.13 (For example, people of middle education on 
average report 0.23 score points more satisfaction with life than people with lower education.) In 
the ordered probit estimation, a positive coefficient indicates that the probability of stating 
happiness greater than or equal to any given level increases. The marginal effect indicates the 
change in the share of persons belonging to a stated happiness level when the independent 
variable increases by one unit.14 In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is  evaluated 
in regard to the reference group. For simplicity, only the marginal effects for the extreme value of  
                                                 
11 Due to clustering and stratification in contrast to pure random sampling, weights are necessary to get 
approximately unbiased point estimates. Weights are proportional to the inverse of the probability of being sampled. 
In addition, the weights are adjusted to the demographic structure in 1992.  
12 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard errors, due to the 
effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton 1990). To get unbiased standard errors for the aggregate 
variable “direct democratic rights”, the 26 cantons are used as sampling units. (Ignoring clustering, a t-value of 5.079 
instead of 3.054 is estimated in Table 1.) Apart from clustering, stratification also has a downward effect on standard 
errors. The significance levels take into account the bias due to stratification, i.e. p<0.01 for  |t|>2.88, 0.01<p<0.05 
for 2.17<|t|<2.88 and 0.05<p<0.10 for 1.81<|t|<2.17. 
13 For a continuous variable, the coefficient indicates the increase in happiness scores when the independent variable 
increases by one unit. 
14 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change of the probability belonging to a stated happiness level 
when the independent variable increases by one unit. 
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Table 1. 
 
Direct Democracy and Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland in 1992 
 
 Weighted least squares 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Weighted ordered probit 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
(score 10) 
(1) Demographic variables      
Age 30 – 39 -0.145  -1.064  -0.079  -0.865  -0.027 
Age 40 – 49 -0.031  -0.270  -0.008  -0.106  -0.003 
Age 50 – 59 -0.177  -1.898  -0.081  -1.275  -0.027 
Age 60 – 69 0.258*  2.349  0.206**  2.903  0.073 
Age 70 – 79 0.389*  2.866  0.295**  3.401  0.106 
Age 80 and older 0.341*  2.519  0.273**  2.968  0.099 
Female 0.039  0.765  0.043  1.211  0.015 
Foreigner -0.450**  -5.146  -0.284**  -5.048  -0.091 
Middle education 0.232**  4.504  0.113**  3.143  0.039 
High education 0.266**  3.387  0.119*  2.472  0.042 
Single woman -0.373**  -6.238  -0.258**  -6.294  -0.083 
Single man -0.295*  -2.557  -0.174*  -2.589  -0.057 
Couple with children -0.090  -1.440  -0.068  -1.777  -0.023 
Single parent -0.614**  -3.312  -0.372**  -3.602  -0.113 
Other private household -0.170  -1.499  -0.128  -1.664  -0.042 
Collective household -0.646**  -3.171  -0.413**  -3.432  -0.124 
Self-employed 0.058  0.796  0.072  1.413  0.025 
Housewife 0.155(*)  2.065  0.123*  2.463  0.043 
Other employment status -0.216(*) -2.110  -0.129(*)  -1.911  -0.044 
       
(2) Economic variables      
Unemployed -1.574**  -5.768  -0.841**  -5.814  -0.211 
Equiv. income Sfr. 2,000-3,000 0.156*  2.697  0.084*  2.199  0.029 
Equiv. income Sfr. 3,000-4,000 0.243**  3.747  0.143**  3.169  0.050 
Equiv. income Sfr. 4,000-5,000 0.399**  5.646  0.258**  5.382  0.092 
Equiv. income Sfr. 5,000 and more 0.302**  4.938  0.192**  4.277  0.068 
       
(3) Institutional variable      
Direct democratic rights 0.116**  2.907  0.082**  3.054  0.028 
       
Observations 6134  6134   
R2 0.091     
Prob > F 0.049  0.001   
 
Notes: Dependent variable: level of satisfaction on an eight point scale (scores of 1, 2 and 3 were aggregated). White 
estimator for variance. In the reference group are ‘people younger than 30’, ‘men’, ‘Swiss’, ‘people with low 
education’, ‘couples’, ‘employed people’ and ‘people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000’. Additional 
control variables (not shown) for size of community (5 variables) and type of community (7 variables). Significance 
levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Data source: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). 
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very high happiness (score 10) are shown in table 1. (For example, being unemployed rather than 
employed lowers the probability of a person stating that he or she is completely satisfied by 21.1 
percentage points.)  
4.2 Demographic and Economic Factors of Life Satisfaction 
Compared to the reference group, people older than 60 are happier. Women are not happier than 
men if the different employment status is considered separately. Furthermore, foreigners are 
subject to a significantly lower probability of reaching high happiness scores compared to the 
Swiss. People with higher education report significantly higher subjective well-being. Couples 
without children are happier than singles, single parents and people living in collective 
households. 
Among the economic variables, higher income correlates with higher happiness in a statistically 
significant way. However, the differences in subjective well-being are rather small. Consider, for 
example, the highest income group with a monthly equivalence income above Sfr. 5,000. 
Compared to persons with low income, only a 6.8 percentage points larger share reports being 
“completely satisfied”. As already alluded to above, unemployment has a very large negative 
influence on individual well-being. The coefficient of this variable is largest in comparison to the 
other significant coefficients mentioned. 
The demographic and economic variables in the happiness equation thus yield very similar results 
for Swiss data as were previously found by Oswald (1997) and Di Tella et al. (1997) for other 
countries, in particular the highly significant and large negative effect of being unemployed, and 
the small positive effect of income.15 
4.3 The Effect of Direct Democracy on Subjective Well-being 
Table 1 also shows the results for one of the institutional variables. The index for direct 
democratic rights has a highly significant positive effect on happiness. An increase in the index 
of direct democracy by one point raises the share of persons indicating very high satisfaction with 
life by 2.8 percentage points. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the institutions of 
direct democracy raise the reported subjective well-being. In addition, the effect itself is sizeable: 
(i) The marginal effect of direct democratic rights on happiness is as large as the effect of living 
                                                 
15 Part of the correlation observed can, of course, be explained by reverse causation. For happy people, it is easier to 
find a partner. They probably less often lose their job and get jobs where they earn more money. 
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in the second-bottom (Sfr. 2,000-3,000) instead of the bottom income category (< Sfr. 2,000). (ii) 
The effect is even larger when the full range of the institutional variable is considered, i.e. 
individuals in canton Basel Land (with the highest democracy index of 5.69) are compared to 
citizens in canton Geneva (with the lowest direct participation rights of 1.75). The former state 
with an 11 percentage points higher probability that they are completely satisfied. (iii) The 
improvement affects everybody, i.e. the institutional factor is important in an aggregate sense. In 
comparison, getting a job “only” raises the subjective well-being of the unemployed. 
Do happy people choose direct democratic institutions? Or does the causality between direct 
democracy and subjective well-being work in reverse? Direct democratic participation 
possibilities in the form of referenda and initiatives in Switzerland started to develop in the 
middle of the 19th century. The adoption of some of the instruments of direct popular 
participation reflects the spread of the spirit and ideas behind the American and the French 
revolutions. Equally important were political movements within the citizenry. Citizens fought for 
direct democratic instruments to gain political power against arbitrary decisions by parliaments 
and the influence of industrial pressure groups on these authorities in the cantons (see e.g. Kölz, 
1998). This historic perspective suggests that the democratic institutions are not simply the result 
of happy and satisfied citizens. Especially during the last decades, institutional conditions in 
Swiss cantons have been quite stable,16 which suggests that causality runs unambiguously from 
direct democratic rights to satisfaction with life. 
4.4 The Effect of Federalism on Happiness 
Table 2 focuses on federalism in the sense of “devolution” as a second important political 
institution hypothesised to raise happiness. Therefore, the variable “local autonomy” is added to 
the demographic and economic factors in the happiness equation. (For simplicity, only the 
coefficients for variables of interest are shown. However, they indicate the partial effects 
controlling for the demographic and economic variables included in table 1. Moreover, the 
coefficients of the latter variables are almost unaltered.17) The estimate reveals a statistically 
significant positive effect on subjective well-being. For local autonomy, the share of persons 
indicating very high happiness increases by 3.3 percentage points, compared to a situation in 
which their commune is one index point less autonomous vis-à-vis their canton. 
                                                 
16 The Spearman rank order correlation of the index for direct democratic rights between 1970 and 1996 is 0.803. 
17 The full estimation results for all the equations are available from the authors on request. 
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Local autonomy and direct democracy are not independent of each other, of course. On the one 
hand, direct democracy fosters federal structures on the national and state level because citizens - 
in contrast to politicians - are most interested in strong federalism (Blankart, 1998). On the other 
hand, the persons bearing the costs and benefits of government action are better identifiable in a 
decentralized system. Direct legislation, therefore, leads to better political decisions and thus 
preserves direct democracy. As a result, the indices for direct democratic rights and local 
autonomy are highly correlated (r = 0.605). This makes it impossible to clearly separate the 
effects of the two variables in one model. The second equation in table 2 jointly includes the two 
constitutional factors, local autonomy and direct democratic rights. The coefficient for the 
variable measuring federalism is roughly one third as large as when it is taken alone and it loses 
its significance. The index for direct democracy has only a slightly smaller marginal effect on life 
satisfaction than estimated in table 1, namely 0.024 instead of 0.028.18 Direct democracy and 
federalism in Switzerland thus seem to be complements rather than economic substitutes. Local 
autonomy is one of the several “transmission mechanisms” of direct democracy’s beneficial 
effects. In the following paragraphs, we therefore focus on direct democracy. 
 
Table 2. 
 
Local Autonomy and Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland in 1992 
 
 Weighted ordered probit 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Weighted ordered probit 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Variable Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
(score 10) 
Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
(score 10) 
(1) Demographic variables yes   yes   
        
(2) Economic variables yes   yes   
        
(3) Institutional variables       
Local autonomy 0.098** 2.913  0.033 0.036 1.005 0.012 
Direct democratic rights    0.071* 2.317 0.024 
        
Observations 6134   6134   
Prob > F 0.003   0.001   
Notes: see table 1. 
Data sources: Ladner (1994), Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). 
 
                                                 
18 In an adjusted Wald test, the two institutional factors together are significant on the two percent level (Prob > F = 
0.0155). 
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4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the reliability of the results, several tests of robustness are performed: (i) the influence 
of outliers is analysed with a DFBETA-test; (ii) an ordinal measure instead of a cardinal one is 
applied for the extent of direct democratic rights; (iii) the effect of the four sub-indices on 
happiness is tested; and finally (iv) four different aggregate control variables are used. 
To investigate whether the positive correlation between direct democracy and happiness is 
largely driven by a single canton, a DFBETA-test is performed. A two-step approach is chosen. 
In the first step, a further weighted ordered probit model with a dummy variable for each canton 
is estimated. In preparation for the second step, the estimated coefficients are correlated with the 
index for direct democratic rights. Due to the problem of heteroskedasticity, a weighted least 
square regression is estimated.19 The result is as follows (t-values in parentheses): 
   fixed effects for cantons = -0.275* + 0.079** x index for direct democratic rights,  
   (-2.653)    (3.041) 
   number of observations = 26 and adjusted R2 = 0.248.20 
With the same estimation model, 26 equations are estimated, with a different canton omitted each 
time. For each equation, the estimated coefficient for the institutional variable is subtracted from 
the coefficient in the base equation (0.079) and divided by the estimated standard error. The 
resulting value is called DFBETA. If it is greater than 1.96 in absolute value, the omitted canton 
has a significant influence on the coefficient of the institutional variable. Table III in the 
appendix shows that no observations from one single canton have a significant influence. The 
maximum value of the DFBETA statistic is –0.829 for canton Ticino.21 This shows that the 
positive effect of direct democracy on happiness is not the result of an influential outlier. 
The applied measure for the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities is constructed 
as a cardinal index. However, the same results should be obtained if ordinal dummy variables for 
direct democratic rights are constructed. To test this claim, cantons were classified into three 
groups: cantons with an index score lower than four have low direct democratic rights, cantons 
with an index between four and five have medium direct democratic rights and cantons with an 
                                                 
19 Heteroskedasticity arises because the coefficients for the canton’s dummy variables are accounted from samples 
with largely different size. Therefore, the weighting variables contain the number of observations per canton. 
20 The results for ordinary least squares are as follows: fixed effects for cantons = -0.402* (-2.277) + 0.125** (3.104) 
x index for direct democratic rights, with adjusted R2 = 0.257. 
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index score above five are ranked highly, with respect to direct democratic rights. The two 
dummy variables for cantons with a medium and a high ranking are included in the estimation 
equation presented in table 3. As can be seen, satisfaction with life is higher for people living in 
cantons with medium and high direct democratic rights. The significant coefficient for the top 
category is 0.179. (The reference group are people who live in cantons, with low direct 
democratic rights). 
The variable for direct democratic participation possibilities is a non-weighted composite index 
(see Appendix). This aggregation leaves behind various substitutive and complementary 
relationships between the single components of the index. Nevertheless, the components can be 
evaluated by themselves. However, the analysis faces the problem of multicorrelation.22 
Therefore, the influence of each component is evaluated separately (see table 3). 
Table 3. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Ordinal Variable and Sub-Indices for Direct Democracy 
 
 Weighted ordered probit, std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Demographic variables yes yes yes yes yes 
      
(2) Economic variables yes yes yes yes yes 
      
(3) Institutional variables      
Direct democratic rights 
   index between 4 and 5 
0.114 
(1.733)     
Direct democratic rights 
   index above 5 
0.179* 
(2.308) 
 
  
     
Index for constitutional 
   initiative 
 0.060* 
(2.311)   
Index for legislative 
   initiative 
  0.072** 
(2.891)   
Index for legislative 
   referendum 
 0.042(*) 
(1.945) 
 
Index for financial 
   referendum 
  0.059** 
(3.075) 
      
Observations 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 
Prob > F 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Notes: see table 1. Coefficients with significance levels. T-values in parentheses. Reference group in equation 1 are 
cantons with direct democratic rights lower than 4. 
Data sources: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office (1997). 
All four sub-indices have a significantly positive effect on reported subjective well-being. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for the two sub-indices for the right to change the canton’s law or the 
                                                                                                                                                              
21 If the fixed effect of this canton is omitted, the coefficient for direct democratic rights increases to 0.100. 
22 The correlation between the four sub-indices is shown in table II in the Appendix. 
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canton’s constitution with a legislative or constitutional popular initiative are largest. Thus, the 
possibility to put new questions on the political agenda is of special importance for the beneficial 
effects of direct democracy on citizens individual well-being. 
In order to test for alternative explanations of the cross-regional differences in happiness, the 
effect of some aggregate control variables is estimated on its own as well as jointly with the 
institutional variable. Table 4 exhibits the results for the two macroeconomic variables “national 
income per capita” and “total tax burden”, as well as for the two language variables “French 
speaking canton” and “Italian speaking canton”. Equation (1) and equation (2) indicate that 
national income per capita does not influence happiness significantly, whether it is controlled for 
institutional differences or not. The same holds for the variable total tax burden in equations 3 
and 4. As can be seen, the introduction of these two macroeconomic variables does not (much) 
affect the size and significance of the direct democracy variable. In contrast, the variables for 
majority language are significantly correlated with reported satisfaction with life, i.e. living in a 
French speaking canton means significantly lower happiness, whereas living in the Italian 
speaking canton Ticino means significantly higher reported subjective well-being (equation 5).  
Table 4. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Aggregate Control Variables 
 
 Weighted ordered probit, std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Demographic variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
(2) Economic variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
(3) Institutional variable       
Direct democratic rights 
 
0.087** 
(3.223)  
0.084* 
(2.698)  
0.080* 
(2.806) 
       
(4) Macroeconomic conditions     
National income per capita 
   in canton (in 1,000) in 1992 
-1.8e-4 
(-0.054) 
-0.004 
(-1.256)   
Total tax burden (index) 
   in canton in 1992 
  -0.002 
(-1.340) 
2.7e-4 
(0.171)  
       
(5) Majority language     
French speaking canton   -0.213** 
(-3.554) 
-0.076 
(-1.123) 
Italian speaking canton   0.073(*) 
(1.963) 
0.252** 
(3.337) 
       
Observations 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 
Prob > F 0.005 0.007 2.0e-4 0.002 0.010 0.001 
Notes: see table 1. Coefficients with significance levels. T-values in parentheses. 
Data sources: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office (1997). 
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However, the lower well-being in the French speaking cantons can to a large extent be explained 
by weaker direct democratic rights (equation 6). In equation (6) the coefficient of the institutional 
variable is almost unchanged and still significant (p < 0.05). It can be concluded that the extent of 
direct democracy has a robust influence on happiness. 
4.6 Who Benefits from Direct Democracy? 
Are the beneficial effects of direct democracy restricted to some privileged groups? To 
investigate this important question of equality, we analyse the influence of direct democracy for 
groups of persons sharing common characteristics in regard to sex, education, employment status 
and income. Technically, interaction variables are included in the estimation equation, in addition 
to the demographic and economic variables. The interaction variables are the product of dummy 
variables for the personal characteristics and the index for direct democratic rights. 
The benefits of direct democracy reaped by women are smaller than for men. However, the 
difference is not statistically significant. There is also no significant difference between the three 
levels of education and the five categories of employment status distinguished, i.e. the positive 
effect of direct democracy does not arise with the education classes and is not bound to a certain 
employment status. We have also analysed whether direct democracy raises the happiness of high 
income recipients, while not doing so for low income recipients. However, the interaction 
variables do not show any statistically significant differences. The positive effect of direct 
democracy on happiness thus does not arise with the income classes, according to our data and 
estimates. 
Overall, direct democracy seems not to be used to discriminate against certain groups within 
society. Moreover, the benefits are distributed rather evenly among social classes. However, a 
large share of residents is formally excluded from participation in the direct democratic process, 
namely foreigners. In the next paragraph, it is argued that they can reap only part of the utility 
derived from direct democracy.  
4.7 Direct Democracy and Procedural Utility 
Do citizens derive procedural utility from being able to participate in the directly democratic 
process? To answer this question, it is crucial to note that political participation in initiatives and 
referenda is restricted to Swiss nationals; only they can reap the respective procedural utility. 
Foreigners, in contrast, have in general no political participation rights. However, they cannot be 
  18
discriminated from the favourable outcome of direct democracy (outcome utility). As foreigners 
cannot reap procedural utility from political participation, they are hypothesised to gain less from 
direct democracy than Swiss citizens. This can be tested either by considering an interaction 
effect between direct democracy and being a foreigner or by running separate equations for 
foreigners and Swiss.23 The results for the latter test are shown in table 5.24  
Table 5. 
 
Satisfaction with Life of Foreigners and Swiss in Switzerland in 1992 
 
 Foreigners 
Weighted ordered probit 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Swiss 
Weighted ordered probit 
Std. err. adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons 
Variable Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
(score 10) 
Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
(score 10) 
(1) Demographic variables yes   yes   
        
(2) Economic variables yes   yes   
        
(3) Institutional variable       
Direct democratic rights 0.035 0.951 0.010 0.098** 3.270 0.034 
        
Observations 743   5391   
Prob > F 0.002   0.006   
Notes: see table 1. 
Data sources: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). 
 
In both equations, direct democratic rights have a positive effect on reported subjective well-
being. However, direct comparison of the two coefficients for direct democratic rights suggests 
that foreigners benefit less than Swiss citizens in cantons in which the institutions of direct 
democracy are well developed. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Swiss majority in more 
directly democratic cantons uses its institutional possibilities to exploit the minority of foreigners. 
The size of the procedural utility gained from being able to participate in the direct democratic 
process can also be assessed. Comparing the positive marginal effect for direct democracy of 3.4 
                                                 
23 Two separate regressions allow different coefficients for the control variables of the sample for foreigners and for 
Swiss citizens and thus foster the ceteris paribus interpretation of the results of the institutional variable. 
24 The results for the former test (a weighted ordered probit estimation with clustering in cantons) are as follows: 
satisfaction with life = ... –0.042 (-0.283) being a foreigner ... + 0.097** (3.384) x index for direct democratic rights 
– 0.067 (-1.699) x interaction term (index for direct democratic rights x being a foreigner), with t-values in 
parenthesis. The coefficient for the index of direct democracy is positive and statistically highly significant. This 
effect accounts for everybody, whether a Swiss citizen or a foreigner. The interaction variable shows that foreigners 
are cet. par. relatively less happy compared to Swiss citizens in cantons in which the institutions of direct democracy 
are well developed. However, the positive effect accounting for everybody is not compensated. This suggests, firstly, 
that foreigners are still better off in a more direct democratic canton and, secondly, that procedural utility, in addition 
to outcome utility, is an important source of satisfaction related to direct democracy. 
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percentage points for Swiss citizens with the marginal effect of 1.0 percentage points for 
foreigners suggests that two thirds of the gain in well-being is due to the application of a 
favourable process in political decision-making.25 Procedural utility, over and above outcome 
utility, is an important source of satisfaction due to direct democracy. 
An alternative interpretation of these results can be advanced on the basis of the missing variables 
problem. Assuming that foreigners and Swiss citizens are equally affected by unobserved 
regional factors, the causal effect of direct democratic rights on happiness is identified by the 
difference in the coefficients for this variable between the two groups.26 According to this 
interpretation, the marginal effect of direct democratic rights on subjective well-being is slightly 
smaller, namely 3.4 minus 1.0, i.e. 2.4 percentage points instead of 2.8 percentage points as 
estimated in table 1. 
5 Conclusions 
With data from interviews of more than 6,000 Swiss residents, we have adduced strong evidence 
that institutional (or constitutional) factors exert a systematic and sizeable influence on reported 
happiness. The existence of extended individual participation possibilities in the form of 
initiatives and referenda, and of decentralised (federal) government structures raises the 
subjective well-being of people. 
The influence of these political institutions on happiness is consistent with the hypothesis that 
politicians in a strongly developed direct democracy are forced more to follow the preferences of 
the voters than when direct popular participation rights are less well developed. Moreover, the 
citizens gain procedural utility from the fuller possibilities to directly participate in the political 
process. Foreigners living in Switzerland are more likely to benefit from the outcome than from 
the process (from which they are excluded). We find indeed that foreigners tend to reap 
systematically positive but lower satisfaction from living in a canton with strongly developed 
direct participation rights than do the Swiss. 
                                                 
25 Quantitatively very similar results are obtained if interaction terms for direct democratic rights and being Swiss 
and being foreigner, respectively, are included in one equation instead of estimating two separate regressions. 
26 This interpretation is analogous to the differences-in-differences estimator for time series as e.g. applied in Card 
(1990). 
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These results, with respect to the institutional determinants of happiness, are obtained even if the 
"standard" determinants of happiness due to demographic and economic factors are controlled 
for, and a number of robustness checks are undertaken.  
In consonance with other happiness studies, unemployment is associated with a considerably 
lower level of subjective well-being. A higher equivalence income has a statistically significant 
positive but small effect on happiness. 
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Appendix 
 
Index for direct democratic rights and local autonomy in Swiss cantons 
Direct democracy is here defined in terms of individual political participation possibilities. In 
Switzerland, institutions for the direct political participation of citizens exist on the level of the 
federal state as well as on the level of cantons. However, the direct democratic rights on the level 
of cantons are very heterogeneous. Therefore, an index is constructed to measure the different 
barriers to citizens entering the political process, apart from elections in the year 1992. The index 
is based mainly on data collected in Trechsel and Serdült (1999) (for details see Stutzer 1999). 
The four main legal instruments directly influencing the political process in Swiss cantons are 
a) the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution, 
b) the popular initiative to change the canton’s law, 
c) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new law or changing law and 
d) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. 
Barriers are in terms of 
a) the necessary signatures to launch an instrument (absolute and relative to the number of 
citizens with the right to vote), 
b) the legally allowed time span to collect the signatures and 
c) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a financial referendum. 
(Compulsory referenda are treated like referenda with the lowest possible barrier.) 
Each of these restrictions is evaluated on a six point scale: “one” indicates a high barrier, “six” a 
low one. From the resulting ratings, a non-weighted average is calculated for each instrument (i.e. 
four sub-indices) and for the composite index, which represents the measure of direct democratic 
rights in Swiss cantons. The results are presented in table I. 
The index for local autonomy is based on survey results by Ladner (1994). Chief local 
administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities reported how they perceive their local autonomy on a 
10 point scale, with one indicating “no autonomy at all“, and  10 “very high“ communal 
autonomy. Average scores for each canton are also shown in table I. 
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Table I. 
Index for Direct Democratic Rights and Local Autonomy in Swiss Cantons 
 
Canton Direct democracy  Local autonomy
 Index for 
constitutional 
initiative 
Index for 
legislative 
initiative 
Index for 
legislative 
referendum 
Index for 
financial 
referendum 
Composite index 
for direct 
democratic rights 
  
Aargau 5.67 5.67 6.00 4.50 5.46  4.9 
Appenzell i. Rh. 6.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 5.25  5.0 
Appenzell a. Rh. 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.50  5.8 
Bern 2.67 2.67 3.67 5.00 3.50  4.6 
Basel Land 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.75 5.69  4.3 
Basel Stadt 4.67 4.67 4.00 4.25 4.40  5.5 
Fribourg 2.67 2.67 2.33 2.00 2.42  4.2 
Genève 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.75  3.2 
Glarus 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.50  5.6 
Graubünden 4.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 4.75  5.8 
Jura 4.67 4.67 3.00 2.50 3.71  4.0 
Luzern 4.67 5.33 3.67 4.25 4.48  4.1 
Neuchâtel 2.67 2.67 1.67 1.50 2.13  3.7 
Nidwalden 2.67 6.00 6.00 5.00 4.92  5.5 
Obwalden 5.33 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.58  6.0 
Sankt Gallen 3.33 4.00 3.00 3.25 3.40  4.9 
Schaffhausen 5.33 5.33 5.17 4.50 5.08  6.1 
Solothurn 5.33 5.33 6.00 5.00 5.42  4.9 
Schwyz 5.33 5.33 4.67 4.38 4.93  4.6 
Thurgau 3.67 3.67 4.33 4.50 4.04  5.9 
Ticino 1.33 2.67 1.67 2.75 2.10  4.3 
Uri 5.67 5.67 5.33 5.00 5.42  5.4 
Vaud 2.33 2.33 2.00 3.00 2.42  4.7 
Valais 3.00 3.67 6.00 1.00 3.42  5.5 
Zug 5.00 5.00 3.67 4.00 4.42  6.0 
Zürich 3.33 3.33 6.00 4.00 4.17  5.4 
 
Source: Ladner (1994) and own calculations on the basis of  Trechsel and Serdült (1999). 
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Table II. 
Correlation of Sub-indices and Composite Index for Direct Democratic Rights and Local Autonomy in 
Swiss Cantons 
 
 CI LI LR FR DDR LA 
Index for constitutional 
   initiative (CI) 1.000      
Index for legislative 
   initiative (LI) 0.871 1.000     
Index for legislative 
   referendum (LR) 0.669 0.772 1.000    
Index for financial 
   referendum (FR) 0.539 0.632 0.562 1.000   
Composite index for direct 
   democratic rights (DDR) 0.888 0.943 0.877 0.767 1.000  
Local autonomy (LA) 0.410 0.506 0.646 0.531 0.605 1.000 
 
 
Table III. 
Sensitivity Analysis: DFBETA-Test for 26 Swiss Cantons 
Independent variable: direct democratic rights 
 
Omitted observation β0 DFBETA Omitted observation β0 DFBETA 
Aargau 0.078* 0.030 Nidwalden 0.079** 0.007 
Appenzell i. Rh. 0.079** -0.007 Obwalden 0.073** 0.264 
Appenzell a. Rh. 0.073** 0.241 Sankt Gallen 0.082** -0.108 
Bern 0.081** -0.072 Schaffhausen 0.083** -0.161 
Basel Land 0.088** -0.325 Solothurn 0.081** -0.049 
Basel Stadt 0.078** 0.065 Schwyz 0.078** 0.062 
Fribourg 0.073* 0.217 Thurgau 0.079** 0.025 
Genève 0.080** -0.035 Ticino 0.100** -0.829 
Glarus 0.080** -0.027 Uri 0.077** 0.073 
Graubünden 0.080** -0.025 Vaud 0.058* 0.775 
Jura 0.079** 0.002 Valais 0.080** -0.024 
Luzern 0.084** -0.186 Zug 0.078** 0.042 
Neuchâtel 0.075* 0.139 Zürich 0.082** -0.117 
 
Notes: A value of DFBETA greater than 1.96 in absolute value shows an influential observation. Weight: inverse of 
the number of observations per canton. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Data sources: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). 
 
